Clash of Laws: Supreme Court Quashes FIR Against MP in Airport Security Breach Case


Court: Supreme Court of India.

Case Name: THE STATE OF JHARKHAND vs. NISHKANT DUBEY.

Citation: 2025 INSC 94 (Reportable)

Background of the Case

The State of Jharkhand appealed against a Jharkhand High Court judgment that had quashed an FIR against Dr. Nishikant Dubey, a Member of Parliament, and others. The FIR, registered as Deoghar Kunda P.S. Case No. 169 of 2022, alleged offenses under Sections 336, 447, and 448 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and Sections 10 and 11A of the Aircraft Act, 1934.

The High Court had quashed the FIR, citing mala fides and an abuse of the legal process. It held that the Aircraft Act is a complete code, with specific procedures for lodging complaints. The High Court noted that the FIR was filed despite clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the flight took off within the permitted time. The High Court also took note of the fact that several similar FIR's against the accused had been quashed by the Court previously.

Allegations in the FIR

The FIR alleged that on August 31, 2022, the accused boarded a chartered plane at Deoghar Airport. The pilot was initially denied take-off permission by ATC. The FIR stated that the pilot and the accused forcefully entered the ATC room and pressured officers to grant take-off clearance despite sunset time being past permissible limits.

The FIR claimed that these actions constituted a serious security breach, violating Airport (Security) Rules, 2011. The offences alleged included endangering life (Section 336 IPC), criminal trespass (Sections 447 & 448 IPC), and violations of the Aircraft Act. According to the FIR, the accused had entered the ATC room without permission, and pressured ATC personnel to grant clearance for their chartered flight’s take-off, despite initial denial due to low visibility and bad weather. The FIR also claimed that the flight took off after sunset, in violation of safety regulations.

Arguments of the Appellant (State of Jharkhand)

The State of Jharkhand argued that the accused forcefully trespassed into a restricted area and threatened ATC officers. They contended that the Respondents had coerced the ATC to give take-off clearance against low visibility, bad weather and after sunset. The State argued that the Aircraft Act’s bar (Section 12B) on cognizance of offences only applies after investigation is complete. It also argued that the High Court had erred in stating that since the Aircraft Act is a Special Act, IPC offences are not attracted. The State also stated that the High Court had conducted a mini-trial while deciding the writ petition.

The State highlighted the violation of Rule 14(ix) of the Airport (Security) Rules, 2011, regarding security supervision in restricted areas. They argued that the rules were framed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Aircraft Act, 1934, which allows the central government to make rules to safeguard civil aviation against unlawful interference. The State cited the case of State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sanjay, and other judgments to argue that the special act does not bar the police from registering the FIR. The State also submitted that the High Court had erroneously adjudicated upon disputed questions of fact when the investigation was at an early stage.

Arguments of the Respondents (Dr. Nishikant Dubey & Ors.)

The respondents argued that the FIR misrepresented a routine meeting as a forcible trespass. They stated that Dr. Dubey, as Chairman of the Airport Advisory Committee, was reviewing airport functioning and operational issues. The respondents argued that the FIR's claim that the flight could only operate until 17:30 hrs was legally incorrect. They pointed out that “flight by night” is defined as a flight performed between half an hour after sunset and half an hour before sunrise. The flight took off at 18:17, within this permitted window, when sunset was at 18:03.

The respondents also argued that take-off clearance was given by ATC, Kolkata, not Deoghar, and that there was no attempt to influence ATC-Kolkata. They emphasized that the Aircraft Act, 1934, is a special law, which prevails over general laws like the Code of Criminal Procedure. They cited various sections (4A, 4B, 4C) for the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, and Aircraft Accidents Investigation Bureau to show that aviation is governed by a special framework. They also pointed out Rule 90 of Aircraft Rules 1937 regarding entry into public aerodromes. The Respondents also pointed out that section 12B of the Aircraft Act required that complaints to be made by or with the sanction of Aviation authorities, which was not followed. The respondents also stated that the security incident investigation has to be conducted by authorities under Rule 45 and 46 of the Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011.

The respondents contended that they had committed no acts to endanger anyone's life, and they did not intimidate anyone at the airport. They argued that the FIR was filed with a mala fide intent against Dr. Dubey, as several similar FIRs against him and his family have been previously quashed by the High Court. The Respondents pointed out that the ATC clearance was granted by Kolkata, so there was no basis to accuse them of pressuring the Deoghar officials.

Rationale, Reasoning given by the Judges

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's power under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash an FIR to prevent abuse of process and to secure justice. The Court relied on State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors..

The Court found that no IPC offences were made out. Specifically, the court found that merely asking for ATC clearance did not constitute rash or negligent behavior endangering lives under Section 336 IPC. Further, the court ruled that criminal trespass under Sections 447/448 IPC requires an intent to commit an offense or to intimidate/insult, which was absent in this case. There was no allegation of forcible entry; furthermore, the Airport director was also accused in the FIR. The court also noted that the ATC office was not a space that would fall under the purview of Section 448.

The Court agreed with the High Court that the Aircraft Act, 1934, and its rules constitute a complete code for matters of civil aviation safety and security, including procedures for taking cognizance of offences. Section 12B of the Aircraft Act is a pre-condition for taking cognizance of any offence under the act, and requires a complaint to be made by authorized aviation authorities. The Court also cited Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 4(2) which mandate that special laws prevail over general laws in cases where special procedures are prescribed. Therefore, the local police were not authorized to file the FIR, and the materials collected have to be forwarded to the authorized officers who can decide whether to file a complaint. The Supreme Court upheld that the investigation by local police was not barred, but the matter collected had to be forwarded to the designated Aviation Authority who would decide if a formal complaint needs to be lodged in court.

Excerpt

  • “The Aircraft Act, 1934 as well as the Rules framed thereunder [including Rule 14(ix) of Airport (Security) Rules, 2011] is a complete Code which deals with safety and security of civil aviation and aerodrome. The Aircraft Act, 1934 also prescribes a special procedure for taking cognizance of any offence punishable under the Aircraft Act, 1934 i.e, the complaint must be made by or with the prior sanction of the Aviation authorities. Section 12B is in the nature of a pre-condition for taking cognizance by a Court.”
  • "To constitute criminal trespass the prosecution has to allege that the trespass was committed with one of the intents enumerated in Section 441 IPC. Accordingly, the prosecution has to prove that the complainant had possession of the property in question and that the accused entered into or upon the property; or after having lawfully entered unlawfully remained there with the intention (a) to commit an offence; or (b) to intimidate, insult, or annoy the person in possession. In the absence of any such allegation, the offence under Section 441/447 IPC cannot be sustained.”
  • “Section 336 IPC seeks to punish a person who does an act rashly or negligently and endangers human life or personal safety of others. To attract Section 336 IPC, the prosecution must allege that the accused did the act in question; that it was done rashly or negligently and that it was such as to endanger the life or personal safety of others.”

Points to Remember

  • Special Law Precedence: The Aircraft Act, 1934 is a special law and a complete code in itself for matters concerning aviation safety and security. It has specific procedures which need to be followed in case of any violation. Special laws prevail over general laws.
  • Limits of Police Investigation: The police’s powers are limited when a special law provides a specific procedure for investigating offences and the competent authorities to file complaints.
  • Importance of Section 12B: Section 12B of the Aircraft Act mandates that a complaint be made by an authorized officer of the aviation authorities before a court can take cognizance of any offense under this act.
  • FIRs as a tool of harassment: The Court acknowledged that the FIR was potentially filed as an act of harassment, given the previous similar complaints against the Respondents.
  • No Criminal Trespass: The actions of the individuals who entered the ATC did not meet the legal definitions of Sections 447 and 448 of the IPC, due to the absence of any evidence of intention to commit an offense or to intimidate/insult anyone.
  • Section 336 IPC not applicable: The actions of the accused did not constitute any act that would qualify as endangering life.
  • The final ruling of the Supreme Court was to dismiss the appeals made by the State of Jharkhand. The Court granted liberty to the State of Jharkhand to forward any material collected to the relevant aviation authorities, allowing them to decide whether a formal complaint under the Aircraft Act was necessary.
  • The court also stated that the local police were not authorized to file the FIR.

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